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Abstract: In recent years, ‘critical institutionalism’ has emerged as a school of 
thought in its own right. Among its strengths is a focus on institutions as both 
complex and embedded, where institutional change is understood as a process 
of bricolage. Yet a number of distinct challenges follow from this. These include 
capturing the ‘complex-embeddedness’ of institutions; making critical institution-
alism amendable to the world of policy; investigating the more hidden, informal, 
and everyday dimensions of institutional life; and providing explanations of com-
mons governance that foreground the workings of power and meaning. In this 
paper, I provide an outline of the Critical Institutional Analysis and Development 
(CIAD) Framework, designed to explicitly reflect the basic tenets and core claims 
of critical institutionalism. Whilst it shares similarities with its predecessors – the 
IAD Framework (Ostrom 1990, 2005) and ‘politicised’ IAD Framework (Clement 
2010) – the modifications it has undergone results in a qualitatively different 
framework geared toward critical institutional research. The paper considers 
ways in which the CIAD Framework facilitates systematic and critical analyses 
of commons governance whilst addressing key challenges a critical institutional 
approach engenders.
Keywords: Critical Institutionalism, Governance, IAD framework, methodo-
logy, power and meaning, structure and agency
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1. Introduction
Much of commons scholarship after Hardin (1968) has been accompanied by an 
attempt to develop a framework for analysing institutions for commons gover-
nance. This endeavour was pursued in particular by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues 
and resulted in the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework 
(Kiser and Ostrom 1982; Ostrom 1990, 2005; Blomquist and DeLeon 2011; 
McGinnis 2011). Over the same period, scholars working in disciplines including 
anthropology, sociology, and development studies were infusing commons schol-
arship with a different set of concepts and ideas. In part, these efforts have served 
as a critique of several of the core assumptions and suppositions that have char-
acterised much work on the commons (e.g. Goldman 1997; Mosse 1997; Cleaver 
2000, 2002; Johnson 2004; Nightingale 2011; Saunders 2014; Schnegg 2016). 
Cleaver (2012) has termed this second school of thought ‘critical institutionalism’ 
in contrast to the other school of thought, typified by the work of Ostrom, which 
she has calls ‘mainstream institutionalism’.
Whilst a clear agenda to develop a framework has accompanied the evolution 
of mainstream institutionalism, the same cannot be said for critical institutional-
ism. In part, this relates to the difficulty of developing a framework that reflects 
the basic tenets and core concerns of the school. This includes the challenge of 
capturing the ways in which commons governance arrangements are embedded 
in historically specific social relations and ecological conditions, where power 
and culture is paramount to explaining their workings. Furthermore, it is likely 
that the development of a ‘multi-purpose diagnostic framework’ is less appeal-
ing to critical institutionalists, who tend to stress plural epistemologies, a degree 
of indeterminism, and the contingent nature of knowledge claims. Despite this, I 
argue that there is value in developing a framework for critical institutionalists. 
In particular, it has utility as an ‘organising principle’ that helps to structure criti-
cal and systematic analyses of commons governance arrangements, alerting the 
analyst to a range of relevant questions, methods, and dynamics. This may prove 
especially useful for less experienced researchers.
In this article, I outline the Critical Institutional Analysis and Development 
(CIAD) Framework. Building on Clement’s (2010) ‘politicised’ IAD Framework, 
the CIAD Framework reflects the theoretical and conceptual insights that under-
pin critical institutionalism. In what follows, I discuss how the CIAD Framework 
is grounded in a critical realist philosophy, charting a middle ground between 
structure and agency to draw attention to the key features of social situations 
and their outcomes. At the same time, I consider the ways in which the CIAD 
Framework may help to address several of the main challenges faced by criti-
cal Institutionalism. These challenges relate to: 1) the ‘complex-embeddedness’ 
of institutions, 2) making critical institutional research amenable to the world 
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of policy, 3) investigating the more hidden, informal, and everyday dimensions 
of institutional life, and 4) providing explanations of commons governance that 
foreground the workings of power and meaning. Given the disciplinary breadth of 
the different scholars who make up critical institutionalism, the CIAD Framework 
proposed here is of course open to a range of critiques and revisions; a point I 
welcome in concluding the article.
2. Critical institutionalism
More recently there have been several efforts to delineate and articulate critical 
institutionalism as a school of thought in its own right (Cleaver 2012; Hall et al. 
2014; Cleaver and de Koning 2015). Here I shall not undertake yet another expo-
sition. Instead, it suffices to provide a short overview of critical institutionalism 
and to bring attention to a number of key challenges it faces. I start with the cen-
tral premise that critical institutionalism conceives of institutions as both complex 
and embedded. This ‘complex-embeddedness’ (Peters 1987) stems from the fact 
that institutions are situated within particular political and economic structures. 
Furthermore, they always enmesh with and emerge out of people’s systems of 
meaning and culturally accepted ways of doing things. As a result, institutions 
tend to reflect, and often entrench, historically specific power relations (Mosse 
1997). Where attempts are made to create or impose new institutions, this is never 
undertaken upon a ‘blank slate’ but instead must contend with these existing 
social relations and cultural paradigms, often leading to outcomes that are both 
unintended and unexpected (de Koning 2011).
A good deal of mainstream institutional thinking focuses on the public spaces 
that undeniably represent an important part of institutional life (whether formal or 
informal). This same thinking proposes that institutions for governing the com-
mons are created or modified by individuals through processes of deliberative 
‘crafting’ or ‘design’ (Feeny et al. 1990; Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Pomeroy and 
Berkes 1997; Ostrom 1999; Dietz et al. 2002). On the other hand, critical institu-
tionalism extends this framing to incorporate the ways in which institutions are 
entwined in people’s everyday practices, and emerge and evolve through dynamic 
processes of ‘institutional bricolage’ (Douglas 1986; Cleaver 2001, 2002). 
Institutional bricolage is a concept that attempts to capture the ways in which 
people both consciously and non-consciously patch together institutional arrange-
ments from the social and cultural resources available to them. Elaborating on the 
concept, Cleaver (2012, 34) writes that by “imbu[ing] configurations of rules, tra-
ditions, norms, and relationships with meaning and authority…people modify old 
arrangements and invent new ones.” Furthermore, “innovations are always linked 
authoritatively to acceptable ways of doing things” where “these refurbishments 
are everyday responses to changing circumstances” (ibid).
Critical institutionalism therefore draws attention to the messy complexity of 
institutional life, ingrained in everyday practices and imbued with power relations 
and cultural meaning. Institutions formed through bricolage are characteristically 
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plural in their functioning, where arrangements that purportedly serve one pur-
pose are adapted to serve others as circumstances dictate (Cleaver 2007; Jones 
2015; Schnegg and Linke 2015). This also implies a degree of indeterminacy, 
overlap, and potential contestation when it comes to the functional remit across 
different institutions (for example, in the case of claims by different state and 
non-state institutions to wield public authority in a given sphere of social life 
[Lund 2006]). Furthermore, institutions seldom perform consistently over time 
but instead operate intermittently in relation to changing conditions (Berry 1994; 
Smith et al. 2001).
2.1. Some challenges
The complex-embeddedness of institutions poses a number of challenges for 
scholars working within a critical institutional tradition. Here I mention several 
of the more pressing concerns. Not least among them is the difficulty of inform-
ing policy (Mosse 2006; Cleaver and Franks 2008). Critical institutional research 
often results in rich descriptions or explanations of particular contexts and situ-
ations. Yet this begs the question, how can this specificity and complexity be 
translated or represented in such a way that it has purchase for public decision-
making? What might make critical institutional research more amenable to policy 
makers whilst maintaining the integrity of the research itself?
Another challenge concerns the domains and scales within and across which 
critical institutional scholars seek answers to the question of the commons. 
Rather than focusing only on the more tangible aspects of commons governance 
arrangements, critical institutionalists concern themselves with those places and 
spaces wherein norms and values that underpin said arrangements are typically 
nurtured, reinforced, or negotiated. There is, therefore, an interest in apparently 
non-relevant associational activities such as weddings and funerals, public meet-
ings, clubs, pubs, and any other customary and enculturated forms of social inter-
action (Nightingale 2011; Cleaver 2012). Furthermore, there is a concomitant 
requirement to understand how wider systems of governance and historical pro-
cesses come to bear on the functioning or operation of more local governance 
arrangements (Mollinga 2008; Merrey and Cook 2012; Saunders 2014; Jones 
2015; Whaley and Cleaver 2017). This draws attention to the workings of broader 
power structures and temporally situated social dynamics.
A final challenge following on from above concerns critical institutional-
ism’s tendency to foreground power and meaning as constitutive features of all 
governance arrangements. The theoretical diversity that accompanies this stance 
suggests a potential methodological quagmire. Critical institutional analyses of 
power and meaning – or ‘politics’ and ‘culture’ in their broadest senses – differ 
considerably in approach. Nonetheless, it is generally recognised that research 
should attempt to capture not only visible and even hidden forms of power (where 
the latter concerns attempts at ‘agenda setting’). Instead, it is also necessary to 
understand the seemingly invisible ways in which power operates through, for 
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example, the prevalence of particular discourses and the tacit cognitive schemes 
that order thought, feeling, perception, and action (cf. Lukes 1974; Bourdieu 
1977; Foucault 1978; Hayward 2000, 2004).
3. The CIAD Framework
The Critical Institutional Analysis and Development (CIAD) framework 
(Figure 1) facilitates research into commons governance that explicitly attempts 
to align with the claims and objectives of critical institutionalism. A central con-
cern is the need to critically and systematically analyse the ‘complex-embedded-
ness’ of institutions. As with its predecessors, the CIAD Framework helps to order 
a research agenda by bringing attention to the relevant aspects of the situations of 
interest and the types of questions one may want to ask. In doing so, it facilitates 
a nuanced analysis of the relationship between structure, agency, and social situa-
tion. The result is an approach that foregrounds power and meaning to understand 
commons governance arrangements, and which reveals the workings of institu-
tional change as processes of bricolage.
The CIAD Framework has been adapted from the original IAD Framework 
(Ostrom 1990, 2005) and a further iteration, the ‘politicised’ IAD Framework 
(Clement 2010). Whilst it shares clear similarities with these previous versions, 
the modifications it has undergone results in a qualitatively different framework 
geared toward critical institutional research. From the outset, it should be recog-
nised that the CIAD Framework dispenses with the game theoretic underpinning 
of Ostrom’s original IAD Framework. It therefore does not function as a tool to 
rigidly and reductively model decision making between individuals and groups 
in any definitive sense. Rather, it is a heuristic device that is suggestive of the 
questions, methods, dynamics, and relationships that facilitate a systematic and 
critical analysis of commons governance arrangements and the ways in which 
they change over time.
Figure 1: The CIAD Framework.
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3.1. Philosophical foundation: critical realism
Critical realism (Bhaskar 1979; Archer 1995; Danermark et al. 2002) is a philoso-
phy of social science that has come to be associated with critical institutionalism 
(Cleaver 2012). I restrict the discussion in this sub-section to locating the CIAD 
Framework in a critical realist paradigm by pointing to how it usefully attends to 
one of the philosophy’s key ontological claims. This claim concerns the relation-
ship between structure and agency, and a related methodological challenge.
Unlike rival structuralist and voluntarist paradigms, critical realism proposes 
that social structure and human agency are recursively implicated in the ongoing 
reproduction and transformation of social systems (signified in Figure 1 by the 
text in the large arrow leading from rules and resources to the social situation). 
This position aligns with Giddens’s ‘structuration’ theory, whereby “the rules and 
resources that are drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action 
are at the same time the means of system reproduction” (Giddens 1984, 19). 
However, the two positions also differ in one important way. Whilst both Giddens 
and proponents of critical realism promote the idea of a recursive relationship 
between structure and agency, critical realists have criticised Giddens’s notion of 
the ‘duality of structure’ for being atemporal and synchronic, failing to provide 
an analytic distinction between structure and agency and therefore collapsing into 
indeterminacy1 (Archer 1995).
Archer (1995) instead argues for what she calls ‘analytical dualism’ whereby 
the ongoing sequence recursively implicating structure and agency is broken up 
analytically into three stages. She terms these three stages ‘Emergence-Interplay-
Outcome’. Emergence is a key concept for critical realists, and here refers to 
the phenomenon whereby structure (represented by the rules and resources cat-
egories of the CIAD Framework) emerge from people’s practices, interactions, 
and other actions whilst at the same time not being reducible to them (Bhaskar 
1979; Elder-Vass 2010). These emergent structures are typically unintended. As 
Bhaskar (1979, 38) argues:
“[P]eople, in their conscious activity, for the most part unconsciously repro-
duce (and occasionally transform) the structures governing their substantive 
activities of production. Thus people do not marry to reproduce the nuclear 
family or work to sustain the capitalist economy. Yet it is nevertheless the 
unintended consequence (and inexorable result) of, as it is also a necessary 
condition for, their activity. Moreover, when social forms change, the expla-
nation will not normally lie in the desires of agents to change them that way, 
though as a very important theoretical and political limit it may do so”
The composition of the CIAD Framework in Figure 1 reflects the various points 
raised in this section. Archer’s triad of Emergence-Interplay-Outcome is captured 
by the Framework’s emergent rules and resources, the interplay between these 
1
 Archer (1995, 2007) calls this ‘central conflation’.
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rules and resources as they are drawn on by participants interacting in the social 
situation, and the outcomes that result. The Framework also captures how the 
outcomes of these situations (the intended and unintended consequences) feed 
back into the rules and resources through a process of emergence. These rules and 
resources then serve as the conditions for future behaviour. The CIAD Framework 
therefore attends to critical realism’s ontological claim concerning the relation-
ship between structure, agency, and emergence, and provides a means of analys-
ing this dynamic by differentiating between rules and resources, social situation, 
outcomes, and the interplay between them.
3.2. The rules and resources
The first part of the CIAD Framework is the rules and resources component. 
This term borrows from Giddens (1984) and represents the structural features 
of the natural and social world most pertinent to critical analyses of institutions. 
However, as purely structural features, rules and resources are essentially ‘out 
of time and space’ and marked by an ‘absence of the subject’ (ibid). Later, I will 
consider the ways in which the CIAD Framework helps the analyst to examine 
how rules and resources are recursively implicated in the reproduction of social 
systems as knowledgeable human actors draw upon them in the social situation. 
At this stage, it suffices to say that rules and resources are both the medium and 
outcome of human actions, as Figure 1 suggests.
In the CIAD Framework, the rules and resources comprise five distinct but 
interrelated categories. These are the biophysical and material world, the political 
economy, social attributes, discourse, and rules and norms. These categories are 
suggestive of particular types of analysis. For example, forms of political econ-
omy or discourse analysis. Unlike in the original IAD Framework, where each of 
the three exogenous variables are contained within discrete boxes, in the CIAD 
Framework the five categories are partitioned by dotted lines. This modification 
is suggestive of the interrelationships between them: that the categories interpen-
etrate and do not succumb easily to treatment in isolation. For example, many 
‘social attributes’ (e.g. gender, race, class) share some relationship with the ‘bio-
physical and material’ (e.g. sex, skin pigmentation, clothing/dress); the meanings 
that constitute particular ‘social attributes’ are constructed within ‘discourse’; and 
‘discourse’ and ‘rules and norms’ are often closely related, not least when it comes 
to understanding institutions2
 (Hajer 1995; Phillips et al. 2004; Dryzek 2005). 
Among other things, the ‘co-action’ (Clement 2010) of the rules and norms cat-
egory with the other four categories underlines the embeddedness of institutions.
Turning to consider the categories in order. Firstly, the biophysical and mate-
rial category encompasses the nature of the resource, resources, or ecosystem 
2
 Dryzek (2005, 20) observes that certain discourses become interwoven with institutions, where 
they “constitute the informal understandings that provide the context for social interaction, on a par 
with formal institutional rules.”
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in question. Here mainstream institutional insights linking particular resource 
characteristics – including excludability, subtractability, stationarity, and storage 
– to the possibility or likelihood of collective action is useful (see Ostrom et al. 
1994). This category also relates to forms of technology, infrastructure, and the 
broader physical landscape, as well as to physiological attributes of actors in the 
social situation. For critical institutionalists, a point of interest concerns the ways 
in which the biophysical and material is co-constituted in dynamic relationship 
with ‘the social’ (Mosse 1997; Cleaver 2012; Whaley and Cleaver 2017). The 
CIAD Framework helps to articulate this dynamic in two ways. Firstly, through 
the co-action of the biophysical and material category with the other four social 
categories of the rules and resources component. Secondly, through the interplay 
between the biophysical and material category and the social situation.
Clement (2010) added the political economy category to the original IAD 
Framework, providing explicit consideration of power and interests. This cate-
gory draws the analyst’s attention to social dynamics that “require one’s analysis 
to expand outward to take account of the wider political and economic factors that 
directly or indirectly influence the behaviour of participants in the [social] situa-
tion” (Whaley and Weatherhead 2014, 14). At the same time, it encourages one’s 
analysis to “expand backward in time so as to understand the events and processes 
that have given rise to present-day conditions” (ibid). A broad political economy 
framing therefore addresses concerns of power, scale, and history shared by many 
critical institutionalists and helps to delineate the ‘room for manoeuvre’ (Long 
2001) of actors at different levels. In doing so, it sheds light on the general limits 
or ‘corridors’ (Sehring 2009) within which institutional change may occur. When 
analysing more local contexts and micro-level interactions, the political economy 
category also points to analyses of the ‘everyday political economy’ (Elias and 
Rethel 2016) of people’s lifeworlds by focusing on the power dynamics, interests, 
and quotidian practices of actors in these social situations.
The ‘social attributes’ category relates to such things as race, gender, class, 
caste, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, age, kinship status, and wealth. To this extent, 
it brings explicit attention to social structure and the relevance of different struc-
tural dimensions for a given context. For example, a consideration of how gender 
structures a social situation may reveal the workings of a patriarchal structure. 
The analyst may observe that only men participate in the situation of interest 
or occupy certain positions, or they may observe that one or more of the prac-
tices typically associated with a position may not be available to the participant 
in question if they are a woman. On the other hand, consideration of class may 
reveal how a capitalist class structure comes to bear on a given situation where 
likewise only people of a certain class participate in it or occupy certain positions. 
Moreover, understanding why some participants in a social situation are able to 
bend or break rules without suffering punitive measures often comes down to 
identifying social attributes of these sorts.
As with the political economy category, Clement (2010) also added a ‘dis-
course’ variable to develop her ‘politicised’ IAD Framework, and which remains 
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as part of the CIAD Framework. The discourse category brings explicit attention 
to the semiotic dimension of social life. It is a way of examining meaning, ratio-
nalities, representations, and types of knowledge, enabling forms of commons 
research that recognise that struggles over resources are also struggles over mean-
ing (Li 1996). Discourse analysis is a broad field that facilitates critical analyses 
of power and meaning and is therefore of much interest to critical institutionalists.
Finally, the ‘rules and norms’ category modifies the original ‘rules’ variable 
of the IAD Framework. Firstly, the change signals that for critical intuitionalists 
an understanding of institutions inevitably incorporates not only rules but also 
people’s norms of behaviour.3 Ostrom (2005, 18) defines rules as “enforced pre-
scriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or per-
mitted.” Whilst this definition of rules is useful, for many critical institutionalists 
it may be too restrictive. Instead, critical institutionalism typically employs more 
sociologically informed ideas about rule taxonomies and definitions.4 This raises 
a second point concerning the inclusion of ‘norms’ in this category. As Hodgson 
(2006, 6) observes, “a hard and fast distinction between rules and norms is often 
difficult to maintain.” Indeed, a distinction between rules, norms, and practices 
brings with it inevitable ‘grey areas’. Whilst mainstream institutionalism often 
attempts to reduce or eliminate this indeterminacy, critical institutionalism instead 
accepts the existence of these grey areas as an inevitable aspect of research into 
the complex and ‘messy’ world of institutions, dynamically embedded in social 
and material relations.
3.3. The social situation: field, domain, and arena
The five rules and resources categories comprise the medium available for partici-
pants to draw upon in the second part of the Framework, namely the social situation 
(Figure 2). The social situation replaces the IAD Framework’s ‘action situation’. 
In part, this is to take attention away from the idea that what is of concern for 
critical institutionalists is only ‘action’ or ‘behaviour’. Instead, critical institution-
alism is also concerned with the hidden and even invisible5 aspects of the social 
world, including the ‘shadowy places’ institutions cast and which oftentimes con-
3
 Ostrom (2005) also pays close attention to norms. However, for her the necessity to include norms 
as part of an institutional analysis is not always clear. Instead, I contend that critical institutionalism 
is far clearer about the fact that norms are a crucial aspect of institutional analysis. 
4
 Crawford and Ostrom (2005) produce their own taxonomy – the ADICO syntax – designed to 
systematically differentiate between rules, norms, and strategies. Despite the clarity of their system, 
and as noted in the main text, in practice distinguishing between rules and norms is not always easy. 
One way in which mainstream institutionalism attempts to produce this clarity is by employing a 
very definite and somewhat restricted definition of rules. Here the focus is “primarily on short-term 
payoffs,” where rules are “linguistic statements containing prescriptions similar to norms, but [that 
also] carry an additional, assigned sanction if forbidden actions are taken and observed by a monitor” 
(Ostrom and Basurto 2010, 322).
5
 See Lukes (1974) for his discussion of hidden and invisible, or ‘two-dimensional’ and ‘three-di-
mensional’, power.
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ceal the everyday workings of power (Douglas 1986).6 The term also responds to 
McCay’s (2002) call for commons scholars to pay greater attention to what she 
calls ‘situation’, including how rules and property rights emerge from within par-
ticular historical, ecological, and cultural traditions. McCay (2002, 393) argues 
that explaining how people relate to each other and their environment “requires 
specification of those traditions and their broader context.” These are concerns the 
CIAD Framework deals with explicitly by examining the relationship between 
rules and resources and the elements of the social situation (see below).
The social situation represents the social space of interest to the analyst. In the 
CIAD Framework it is bordered by a dotted line, suggesting both the porosity or 
semi-autonomous nature of most situations (Moore 1978) and their relative inde-
terminacy, with the corollary that they tend to elude precise definition. Following 
Long (2001), the social situation can be any one of three qualitatively different 
types. These are the field, domain, or arena. These three types of social situation 
do not correspond to the nested ‘operational’, ‘collective-choice’, and ‘constitu-
tional’ levels of governance associated with the original IAD Framework. Whilst 
the latter concepts refer to ‘deeper’ levels of rule following and rule-changing situ-
ation, fields, domains, and arenas instead help the analyst to identify qualitatively 
different (although often interlocking or interpenetrating) types of social situation 
based on their relative internal coherence and cohesiveness. As Long (2001, 57) 
observes, “all three concepts address the issue of the bounding of social spaces 
and how they are constituted and transformed.”
With this in mind, a ‘field’ tends to be large and lacking a single organising 
principle. It will often be the broadest analytical boundary, within which different 
domains and arenas are considered. Examples may be a geographical area per-
taining to a region, river catchment, or biome. Next, the ‘domain’ relates to those 
6
 This position is captured by the mantra that “what you see is usually not what you get” (De Herdt 
and Olivier De Sardan 2015, 2).
Figure 2: The Social Situation.
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situations typified by a degree of commonality: a core or cluster of rules, norms, 
discourses, and values engendering a degree of social commitment among partici-
pants. From the myriad potential social situations that could count as a domain, 
of much interest to commons scholars has been the local governance arrange-
ments in place for the management, access, and use of common pool resources. 
Finally, ‘arenas’ are situations characterised by confrontation, contestation, and 
difference, often located at the interface between actors’ various lifeworlds or 
distinct ‘spheres of existence’. An example would be the interface between local 
communities and district-level extension workers. Whilst arenas reveal sites of 
difference and contestation they typically also reveal the boundaries and shared 
expectations that have developed in order to mediate between participants in dif-
ferent positions. Furthermore, domains may be replete with their own arenas – 
points of confrontation, negotiation, and difference – that become apparent as the 
analyst moves in to consider the internal dynamics of the situation. This reveals a 
notable strength of the CIAD Framework in that it permits movement within and 
across scales of organisation and levels of abstraction, in accordance with one’s 
research agenda.
3.4. The social situation: structure, agency, and system
All social situations share the same internal composition of nine distinct elements 
(Figure 2). Broadly speaking, these elements can be divided into two groups. The 
first group comprises the three ‘systemic elements’ of participants, positions, and 
practices, and the second the six ‘agential elements’ of goals and objectives, capa-
bility, knowledge, values, emotions, and strategies and tactics. When these ele-
ments are considered in relation to each other and to the five rules and resources 
categories, they draw the analyst’s attention to questions of structure and agency 
within specific social contexts. Here I will consider the social situation’s  systemic 
and agential elements in turn, as well as their interplay with the rules and resources 
categories. I draw in particular on the social theory of Giddens (1984).
As mentioned above and following Giddens, the rules and resources catego-
ries that structure situations are in a sense ‘out of time and space’ and marked by 
an ‘absence of the subject’. In contrast to this, Giddens (1984, 25) argues that 
“the social systems in which structure is recursively implicated…comprise the 
situated activities of human agents, reproduced across time and space” (Giddens 
1984, 25). This understanding of how structure and agency combine in particular 
situations to produce social systems points to the appropriateness of the use of the 
term ‘systemic’ to describe the participant, position, and practices elements. This 
is because social systems are “relations between actors or collectivities, organised 
as regular social practices” (Giddens 1984, 25). Reinterpreting this last point in 
light of the three systemic elements, we can say that social systems comprise 
individual or collective actors (the participants), the relationships between these 
actors (understood as a property of their respective positions), and their regular 
social practices.
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The systemic elements therefore require the analyst to identify who partici-
pates in the social situation of interest, their respective positions – such as water 
users, Water Point Committee members, village chief, or District Water Officer 
– and the identifiable set of practices that are typically associated with these posi-
tions. For example, practices associated with a water user could include collect-
ing water (e.g. walking to the water point, queuing, pumping, and carrying the 
water home); cleaning the water point and its surroundings; paying user fees; and 
attending gatherings to discuss water-related issues, decide on rules of access and 
use, or to vote in members of the Water Point Committee.
In keeping with critical institutionalism, people’s practices – and not indi-
viduated actions – therefore become key to understanding institutional func-
tioning and development. A practice can be thought of as “a routinized type of 
behaviour which consists of several elements, interconnected to one other: forms 
of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, ‘things’ and their use, a back-
ground knowledge in the form of understanding, know-how, states of emotion 
and motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz 2002, 248–249). In effect, practices are 
the lynchpin that bind structure and agency in time and space to produce recog-
nisable social systems. All commons governance arrangements are comprised 
of participants in different positions engaging in a spectrum of routinized and 
exploratory practices. Whilst practices provide governance arrangements with 
their systemic form, they must also be understood as conduits through which a 
good deal of human agency is exercised. Crucially then, for critical institutional-
ists agency is not simply a form of conscious and deliberative thought or action. 
Instead, agency is also, and often, less-consciously or non-consciously exercised 
by people engaged in their various social practices, informed by what Bourdieu 
(1990) called a ‘feel for the game’.
Understanding agency therefore requires conceiving of the ways in which 
habitualised and creative forms of behaviour co-exist (Cleaver 2012). Drawing 
on insights from social theory, in the social situation agency is captured by six 
agential elements, namely goals and objectives, capability, knowledge, values, 
emotions, and strategies and tactics. As compared to Ostrom’s (2005) action 
arena, here the ‘information’ element has been replaced by the ‘knowledge’ ele-
ment, and the ‘control’ element by the ‘capability’ element. These two modified 
elements are still able to perform the same functions as before,7
 however the 
new terminology expressly relates to what Giddens (1984) claims are the basic 
characteristics of human agency, namely ‘knowledgeability’ and ‘capability’.8 
The knowledge element may be unpacked in various ways. So, for example, into 
7
 That is, ‘knowledge’ can still imply ‘information’, and ‘capability’ can still infer a capacity to 
exercise ‘control’.
8
 ‘Knowledgeability’ concerns reflexive self-monitoring, the monitoring of others, and a general 
awareness of situation – “The monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life” (Giddens 
1984, 3) – whilst ‘capability’ concerns a capacity “to command relevant skills, access to material and 
non-material resources and engage in particular organising practices” (Long 2001, 49).
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forms of  information, understanding, and belief.9 The capability element relates 
to an actor’s skills and competencies, their ability to access and mobilise rules and 
resources, and to engage in particular organising practices.
The addition of an emotions element to the social situation brings explicit 
attention to how people’s feelings, fundamentally rooted in a need for ontological 
security, motivate them to behave in particular ways. When combined with the 
knowledge and capability elements, human actors are understood to be ‘knowing/
feeling active subjects’ (Long 2001, 20). The addition of a values element pro-
vides further nuance to understanding agency and replaces the more economically 
reductive concept of ‘costs and benefits’ used by Ostrom and others in the original 
IAD Framework. Instead, this element requires the analyst to consider partici-
pants’ broader notions of worth and usefulness as they relate to things, events, 
processes, and outcomes. Values do not only capture perceived payoffs of poten-
tial outcomes but also principles or standards of behaviour and what is considered 
important in life.
The four agential elements discussed so far – capability, knowledge, values, 
and emotions – inform a participant’s goals and objectives, as indicated by the 
unidirectional arrows in the social situation (Figure 2). Together these goals and 
objectives help the analyst to understand the interests of different participants 
and their motivation for acting in certain ways and toward particular ends. Here 
‘goals’ refer to the long-term aims held by participants and tend to be relatively 
broad and abstract. In a sense, they relate to an actor’s life project or projects, 
although these will always be subject to change. On the other hand, ‘objectives’ 
are more short-term and concrete. However, as indicated in Figure 2, goals and 
objectives emerge not only in relation to the four agential elements just discussed 
but also in relation to the positions of participants in the social situation. These 
positions typically relate to inclusion of the participant in particular social institu-
tions or organisations, inferring that the goals and objectives of the participant 
will oftentimes overlap with the goals and objectives of the institution or organ-
isation. Unlike the other five agential elements, the goals and objectives element 
is not directly structured by rules and resources but only indirectly in a pivotal 
relationship with all the other elements in the social situation.
Goals and objectives both inform and are informed by the last of the six agen-
tial elements, namely strategies and tactics. As noted above, the CIAD Framework 
understands agency as typically exercised through practices, and with varying 
degrees of conscious awareness. Here I draw upon de Certeau (1984) to argue that 
when people engage in practices we can think of them as doing so either strategi-
cally or tactically. For de Certeau (1984), ‘strategies’ are conceived of and imple-
mented by more powerful actors – the ‘producers’ (rulers, authorities, etc.) – and 
are attempts to rationalise space and exert forms of control over it. On the other 
hand, ‘tactics’ describe the ways in which ‘consumers’ of these spaces ‘poach’ 
9
 And, more theoretically, into ‘embodied’, ‘practical’, and ‘discursive’ knowledge (Archer, 2000).
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on existing rules and structures. They are the forms of ‘necessary improvisation’ 
undertaken by the less powerful – the ‘dominated masses’ – as they negotiate 
the exigencies of everyday life.10 Tactics function as “internal manipulations of 
a system…of established order” (de Certeau 1984, 29). Differentiating between 
strategies and tactics is therefore a useful way of thinking about agency and power 
in the social situation. This includes attempts by more powerful actors to exert 
control (strategically) and less powerful actors to manoeuver within limits (tacti-
cally). It also helps to articulate aspects of institutional emergence or change,11 as 
well as imposition.12
3.5. A note on power and meaning
Power and meaning have long and variegated histories in the social sciences. 
Here I will briefly consider one way in which the CIAD Framework functions 
to explore these concepts through its focus on the recursive relationship between 
structure and agency. Whilst the approach taken here is certainly not exhaustive, it 
does provide a useful means for thinking about and analysing power and meaning 
using the CIAD Framework.
For Giddens (1984), the ability to exercise agency relates to the capability to do 
things, which necessarily infers power. However, as agency and structure are inter-
dependent, understanding the ability of different participants to exercise power in 
the social situation requires an understanding of the structural resources available 
to them: “resources are media through which power is exercised, as a routine ele-
ment of the instantiation of conduct in social reproduction” (Giddens 1984, 16). 
Giddens distinguishes between allocative and authoritative resources. Allocative 
resources refer to “material resources involved in the generation of power, includ-
ing the natural environment and physical artefacts” (Giddens 1984, 373). On the 
other hand, authoritative resources refer to “non-material resources involved in the 
generation of power” (ibid, 373) and include discourses, policies, rules, relation-
ships, concepts, and ideas. Here non-material resources in particular are represen-
tative of the meaning (or semiotic) dimension of social structure.
Returning to the CIAD Framework, it is apparent that these material and non-
material resources are well captured by the various categories of the rules and 
resources component. Their relevance for thinking about differentials in power 
among participants results from their interplay with the various systemic and 
agential elements in a social situation. In effect, the rules and resources relevant 
to a given social situation will position different participants differently in that 
situation. Depending on their positions, participants will have differing access to 
10
 Moore (1978) makes a similar distinction when she talks about processes of ‘regularisation’ and 
processes of ‘situational adjustment’.
11
 As a rational project of ‘crafting’ or ‘building’, on the one hand; or, on the other, through the 
“gradual erosion and displacement” (de Certeau 1984, 34) of institutions from ‘within’.
12
 For example, through state or NGO-led attempts to ‘induce’ community-based management pro-
grammes by forming village-level committees, user associations, and the like.
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and capability to draw upon the rules and resources in the course of (consciously 
or non-consciously) attempting to achieve particular goals and objectives. This in 
turn reflects their differing abilities to exercise agency, and thus power.
3.6. Evaluating interactions and outcomes
A range of criteria can be used to evaluate both interactions and outcomes in the 
CIAD Framework. From a critical institutional perspective, a key evaluative cri-
terion is social justice. Social justice applies to interactions in the social situation 
through procedural and interactional justice concerns and to the outcomes com-
ponent through a distributive justice lens. Of course, this is not to say that there 
are no other evaluative criteria of importance to critical institutionalists. Among 
them, we may point to the transaction costs of different interactional settings 
(information, coordination, and strategic costs), and to other overall performance 
categories, including sustainability, resilience, or efficiency.
Furthermore, the CIAD Framework accommodates the possibility that more 
than one person may participate in an evaluation process, and often through 
recourse to including the research participants themselves. As a result, a dotted 
line bounds the evaluation box, indicating that it too may be a semi-autonomous 
social situation (in this case a domain, or even an arena). The two-way arrow 
between the evaluation box and the social situation indicates that not only are 
evaluation criteria applied to social situations but also that the participants in these 
situations can contribute to the evaluation process itself. This may be particularly 
important for some critical institutionalists for whom the validity and integrity of 
their claims about a social dynamic under investigation requires the views of the 
people who themselves make up that dynamic.
As a minimum, forms of participatory evaluation may help to produce claims 
that do not grossly misrepresent the people and issues in question. However, treat-
ing participatory evaluation processes as social situations also highlights the sorts 
of relations and interactions made explicit in Figures 1 and 2, implying that the 
participatory evaluation process is itself characterised by relations of power and 
meaning.
4. Applying the CIAD Framework
To consider the ways in which the CIAD Framework can be applied to analy-
ses of commons governance, I draw upon Cleaver’s (1995, 2000, 2012) work on 
water management in Nkayi district, western Zimbabwe. I choose this example 
as it is an emblematic critical institutional study that explores institutional emer-
gence and functioning from a complex-embeddedness perspective. Here I focus 
on one ‘domain’ in particular: the local institutional arrangement in place to man-
age water access and use of Mtswirini well in the village of Eguqeni, Nkayi. The 
example will demonstrate that to understand the form and functioning of this 
institutional domain the analytical gaze must be broadened and deepened beyond 
a normal mainstream analysis. It is not possible in the space available to give a 
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comprehensive account of this expanded analysis so I limit the discussion to a 
number of insights that illustrate the benefit of using the CIAD Framework for 
undertaking critical institutional research. In doing so, I also point at how it dif-
fers from the mainstream institutional approach engendered by the original IAD 
Framework.
4.1. General process of applying the CIAD Framework
To recap, the CIAD Framework requires the analyst to identify the range of inter-
locking and interpenetrating social situations of relevance to the governance 
arrangement in question. These social situations are themselves constructed 
through the interplay between the rules and resources categories and the internal 
elements of the social situation. In each case, the CIAD Framework asks the ana-
lyst to consider the composition of the social situation by identifying the different 
participants, their positions and practices, their goals and objectives, strategies 
and tactics, and how these emerge in relation to their capabilities, knowledge, val-
ues, and emotions. These different elements are in turn analysed and understood 
in relation to the five rules and resources categories. Doing so draws attention to 
the interplay between structure and agency, power and meaning, authority, legiti-
macy, and their relationship to processes of institutional bricolage. This itera-
tive analytical process is best served by an ethnographic approach whereby the 
researcher delves into the lifeworlds of the participants by undertaking detailed 
studies of their everyday lives.
4.2. Defining and analysing the field
A critical institutional analysis will typically start by delineating a broad field 
that appears most relevant to the research topic. At this scale, investigating the 
interplay between the elements of the field and the rules and resources catego-
ries provides a working understanding of the distribution of resources, including 
technological capacities, discourses, physical structures, and salient character-
istics of the landscape and climate. Undertaking a political economy analysis 
of the field points to the distribution of power among key participants and to its 
historical trajectory. This broader analysis is particularly useful for framing the 
general conditions within which particular domains and arenas operate. Cleaver 
takes the district of Nkayi as her field, where her analysis identifies several key 
features. These include a troubled political economic history, involving a period 
of guerrilla warfare, the forced migration of its inhabitants to their current loca-
tions, and the suppression of the Ndebele people by the Government’s Fifth 
Brigade after independence. In terms of biophysical and material conditions, she 
observes the prevalence of extended periods of drought in what is an already arid 
landscape and a dependence on boreholes, small dams, and hand-dug wells for 
water. She also notes the presence of two large rivers and several smaller ones, 
all of which are seasonal, where in dry periods people dig holes in the riverbed 
to access water.
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4.3. Identifying relevant domains
Alongside the broad field, a critical institutional approach also takes into account 
the wider institutional landscape at the local level. The intention is to identify 
the variety of spaces, places, and processes that may have a bearing on the form 
and functioning of the institutional arrangement at Mtswirini well. This contrasts 
with mainstream institutionalism where typically the focus is the formal organ-
isational arrangement, such as the water point committee, and potentially how it 
nests in wider formal structures. Cleaver identifies a number of different domains 
that lie beyond the institution domain governing Mtswirini well. These domains 
include village ‘meetings of the people’, rainmaking ceremonies, a women’s sav-
ings group, and the ‘invisible’ arrangement mediating traditional access to and 
use of the Shangani river. It is incumbent on the analyst to identify those domains 
that appear most salient. However, having done so the CIAD Framework then 
structures the analysis in ways that help to reveal the key features of each situation 
and their relationship to the domain of interest. For example, both critical insti-
tutionalism and the CIAD Framework draw attention to features such as people’s 
social positions and relations, everyday practices, forms of knowledge, values, 
emotions, goals and objectives (interests), and strategies and tactics (processes of 
negotiation and adaption).
4.4. Analysing a relevant domain
Consider Cleaver’s analysis of the management arrangement at the nearby 
Shangani River, and how the CIAD Framework accords with it. Here she shows 
how the practices, norms, values, and emotions present in this domain also inform 
the institutional logic underpinning the domain governing access to and use of 
Mtswirini well. These include practices and norms that favour general but con-
ditional access; multiple uses of water, with a balance between domestic and 
productive uses to avoid disputes between neighbours; prioritising practices that 
preserve water quality for drinking; and the need for only minimal formal man-
agement measures due to general compliance. These practices and norms are 
themselves underpinned by knowledge, values, and emotions borne out of the 
history of the area, which Cleaver identified previously during her analysis of 
the broader field. Most notably, she observes how historical exposure to warfare 
and political strife has engendered a strong desire for inclusiveness and conflict 
avoidance. Persistent experiences of drought have also shaped people’s values 
and practices concerning water use.
These underlying principles help to explain the set of norms and practices 
just described and their partial transposition from Shangani River to the inland 
well in Eguqeni village. Importantly, the ways in which the norms and practices 
are adopted and adapted by users of Mtswirini well reveals that the emergence 
of institutional arrangements of this sort are not simply the result of conscious 
and deliberative decision making. Instead, they are often partially or even largely 
the result of less conscious or non-conscious behaviour as enculturated ways of 
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 thinking and doing are drawn upon to piece together arrangements as circum-
stances dictate. The analytical approach the CIAD Framework facilitates there-
fore helps to shine a light on processes of institutional bricolage.
4.5. Other benefits of employing the CIAD Framework
The CIAD framework structures and informs the analysis in ways that point 
to many other noteworthy aspects of governance arrangements from a critical 
institutional perspective. For example, an understanding of the nature of user 
boundaries emerges from exploring the relationship between who participates in 
the social situation and different rules and resources categories. In this respect, 
Cleaver observes how water user boundaries in Eguqeni vary in relation to bio-
physical and material conditions such as seasonal changes and water stress. 
Furthermore, the ability of outsiders to access Mtswirini well in times of water 
stress also depends on social attributes such as kinship relation and wealth sta-
tus. In contrast to the claims of mainstream institutionalism, these insights sug-
gest that the boundaries that characterise access to natural resources are variable, 
dynamic, and ‘fuzzy’.
The addition of new elements and the substitution of the knowledge, capa-
bility, and values elements for the information, control, and costs and benefits 
elements in Ostrom’s original framework opens up new analytical possibilities. 
For example, considering different people’s knowledge, values, and emotions 
in the domain governing Mtswirini well and how these are constructed in rela-
tion to discourse draws attention to the more fundamental ways in which par-
ticipants understand and engage with each other. To this extent, a key finding 
from the Nkayi case study was the existence of what Cleaver calls a ‘moral 
ecological rationality’. She describes this as a “model of decision making that is 
deeply enmeshed in culture, history and agro-ecological conditions but is never-
theless susceptible to modification and change.” This moral ecological rational-
ity functions to order, authorise, and interpret social interaction and hierarchical 
relations, legitimising certain types of behaviour whilst disciplining others. It 
therefore serves as a form of power-knowledge (Foucault 1980) through which 
water management and access in Eguqeni village is achieved. This is a finding 
that the original IAD Framework, with its focus on participants’ ‘information’ 
and ‘costs and benefits’ rather than ‘knowledge’, ‘values’, and ‘discourse’, could 
never have arrived at.
4.6. Considering agency, power, and meaning
To understand how participants in the social situation exercise agency (and power) 
the analyst examines the strategies and tactics they employ – both consciously and 
non-consciously – when engaging in the practices associated with their positions. 
As discussed, their potential to exhibit agency is understood in dynamic relation 
to the rules and resources that structure the social situation and that may be drawn 
upon during the course of social interaction. In the CIAD Framework, the ‘moral-
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ecological rationality’ identified above functions as a form of logic through which 
people interpret life in Eguqueni village. However, it also functions as a resource 
that may be tactically deployed (consciously or non-consciously) by participants 
interacting in a social situation and in accordance with their underlying goals and 
objectives. As the moral ecological framework links authority in the spiritual and 
natural world to authority in the social world (Cleaver 2000), deployment of this 
resource will tend to contribute to outcomes that reproduce the status quo. The 
extent to which this is the case is however an empirical matter that requires the 
analyst to evaluate the outcomes component of the CIAD Framework.
4.7. Analysing arenas
The focus on negotiation, confrontation, and difference moves the analysis from 
one social situation, the ‘domain’, to a qualitatively different one, the ‘arena’. As 
Long (1999, 1) has argued, it is by studying the dynamics that comprise an arena, 
using what he calls an ‘interface analysis’, that the analyst is able to “elucidate 
the types and sources of social discontinuity and linkage present in such situations 
and to identify the organisational and cultural means of reproducing or transform-
ing them.” In the Nkayi study, Cleaver considers a range of arenas. Here the focus 
is on the strategies and tactics different participants employ – for example to bend 
or break water management rules – and how these depend on their capability to 
mobilise rules and resources.
As the discussion has so far suggested, these strategies or tactics do not rely 
on economistic cost-benefit calculations, present in the original IAD Framework, 
but on behaviour informed by underlying values, emotions, and forms of knowl-
edge. For example, the water point committee charged with the formal manage-
ment of Mtswirini well does not practice rule enforcement in a strict, graduated 
manner. Instead, in keeping with the CIAD Framework’s approach to structure 
and agency, Cleaver notes that the committee instead regards these rules as ‘tools’ 
that are drawn upon in a flexible manner. Key to understanding how and when 
the rules are applied are the core values of conflict avoidance and inclusiveness 
identified during the analysis of the field.
In another example, Cleaver shows how participants negotiate water pay-
ments by drawing upon legitimate (and legitimising) discourses; social attributes 
including being related to the headman, or one’s status as a poor single mother; 
physical attributes including disability; and norms of acceptable behaviour (what 
is seen as ‘the right way of doing things’). Whilst Cleaver does draw attention to 
rules and how they structure the social situation, she also demonstrates how dif-
ferent participants are able to negotiate, bend, or break these rules by exercising 
varying degrees of power and agency linked to the distribution of material and 
non-material resources. Furthermore, these features of the social situation typi-
cally intersect in ways that point to the complex identities of participants and of 
institutions embedded in social relations, history, and underlying values, knowl-
edge, and moral orders.
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4.8. Summing up
Whilst necessarily limited in scope, this section has pointed to the utility of the 
CIAD Framework for analysing commons governance arrangements. The inten-
tion has been to provide a flavour of the relationship between the CIAD frame-
work and critical institutional research. It has also considered the ways in which it 
facilitates analyses that move beyond mainstream institutionalism’s focus on the 
“visible and tangible community efforts to manage natural resources” (Cleaver 
2012, 53). The key point to make is that whilst the CIAD Framework does not 
substitute for an analyst’s theoretical knowledge, it does reflect the core features 
and processes that characterise a critical institutional approach. Its strength there-
fore lies in structuring research in ways that provide a systematic and critical 
analysis of the complex-embeddedness of commons governance arrangements.
5. Conclusion
The analytical vistas opened up by the CIAD Framework accommodate system-
atic analyses of complex and socially embedded governance arrangements. These 
arrangements are characterised by interlocking and interpenetrating social situa-
tions that bound spaces of both commonality (domains) and difference (arenas) 
within larger fields of enquiry. The question of how institutional arrangements 
change over time is grounded in an understanding of the recursive relation-
ship between the agency of participants in a social situation and the structure 
of that situation. In this paper, I have outlined how the various components of 
the CIAD Framework and the ways in which they interrelate brings attention 
to this dynamic. This overview was followed by a worked example of how the 
CIAD Framework can be applied to analyses of commons governance. To do so, 
I drew upon Cleaver’s critical institutional analysis of water management in the 
Zimbabwean village of Nkayi.
Here I return to the four key challenges faced by critical institutionalists, men-
tioned at the beginning of this article, by considering the ways in which the CIAD 
Framework is able to address them:
1) The ‘complex-embeddedness’ of institutions. The CIAD Framework facil-
itates analyses that situate systems of rules and norms in relation to peo-
ple’s everyday practices, social relationships and identities, and systems of 
meaning; within the wider political economy; in history; and in reciprocal 
relationship with the biophysical and material world. In doing so, it pro-
motes approaches to understanding commons governance arrangements 
that capture the complexity and embeddedness of real-life institutions.
2) Making critical institutional research amenable to the world of policy. 
The CIAD Framework helps to ‘map’ or organise research, providing clar-
ity and insight. This same framing provides consistency across different 
cases and may be useful to policy makers because of its ability to repre-
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sent pictorially and systematically the complexity critical institutionalism 
embraces. The CIAD Framework may also prompt questions about pro-
ductive places for policy intervention, whilst better contextualising the 
potential impact of said policies. At the same time, it is clear that the chal-
lenge critical institutional research faces in speaking to policy is not com-
pletely overcome by the CIAD Framework, given the rich and detailed 
research findings it engenders.
3) Investigating the more hidden, informal, and everyday dimensions of insti-
tutional life. The CIAD Framework’s taxonomy of social spaces (as fields, 
domains, and arenas) and its elaboration of the internal workings of these 
spaces in terms of people’s everyday practices, values, emotions, and forms 
of knowledge, helps to shine a light onto the ‘shadowy places’ institutions 
cast. The ways in which social situations are constructed by discourses and 
norms (from the rules and resources component of the Framework) further 
assists with analysing hidden, informal, and everyday dimensions. Moreover, 
the questions the CIAD Framework suggests to the analyst, and the structure 
it provides, helps to reveal how the workings of other everyday arrangements 
(domains) come to bear on the institutional arrangement under consideration, 
as demonstrated in the previous section. This focus assists with analysing 
institutional emergence and change as a process of bricolage.
4) Providing explanations of commons governance that foreground the work-
ings of power and meaning. The CIAD Framework embraces a wide range 
of approaches for analysing power and meaning. In this article, I con-
sidered in particular how power and meaning are vital ingredients in the 
interplay between structure and agency. This structure-agency dynamic 
is central to the CIAD Framework. It is by analysing this dynamic that 
the Framework draws attention to the distribution of material and non-
material resources available to different participants in the social situa-
tion, their capabilities to access and deploy these resources, and the power 
differentials that result. Here ‘non-material resources’ comprise the mean-
ingful or semiotic dimension of social structure, including discourses, pol-
icies, social relations, rules, ideas, and concepts. Both power and meaning 
are therefore constitutive and interrelated aspects of analyses that employ 
the CIAD Framework.
In concluding, I make one final point concerning a tendency in the literature 
to embark on projects that attempt to develop and perfect a single framework 
designed to carry out a particular function (such as analyses of social-ecological 
systems). I distinguish myself from this position, and argue instead that we should 
be cautious of efforts to arrive at ‘one framework to rule them all’. A framework 
is only as useful as it is relevant for its user and will be interpreted in different 
ways by different people. To this extent, the CIAD Framework could be viewed 
as a sort of template – a ‘framework for frameworks’ – that can be adopted and 
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adapted by critical institutional scholars in accordance with their disciplinary 
training, subject area, and research agenda. At the same time, I hope the current 
version provides enough traction to prove useful in this respect.
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